BYU Law Review
Volume 2015 | Issue 1

February 2015

The Very Old New Separationism
Alan M. Hurst

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alan M. Hurst, The Very Old New Separationism, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 1 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2015/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Article 3

HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

The Very Old New Separationism
Alan M. Hurst*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 2
II. THE FLAWED STORY OF SEPARATIONISM ’S FALL .................. 4
A. The Conventional Narrative ............................................. 5
B. Problems with the Narrative: Separationism in
Hosanna-Tabor ............................................................ 11
1. A conflict between separationism and neutrality ......... 11
2. A thoroughly separationist opinion ............................. 15
C. Problems with the Narrative: The Difficulty of
Defining Separationism ................................................ 17
1. Separationism’s many meanings................................. 17
2. Separationism’s shared core of meaning ...................... 19
3. The mischief of suppressed assumptions ........................ 21
III. THE NEW FREE EXERCISE SEPARATIONISM :
PROTECTING RELIGIOUS BELIEF ........................................... 24
A. From Cantwell to Sherbert: The Narrow Church of
Belief ............................................................................ 25
1. Protecting belief itself................................................. 25
2. The right to preach..................................................... 27
3. Church autonomy ...................................................... 28
4. Minimal protection for religious practice .................... 29
5. Summary .................................................................. 30
B. Seeger and Yoder: The Impossibly Broad Church ............... 31
C. Smith, Lukumi, and Hosanna-Tabor: Back to the
Church of Belief ............................................................ 33
1. The sharp distinction between belief and conduct ......... 35
2. The freedom to preach ................................................ 37
3. Church autonomy ...................................................... 38
4. Summary .................................................................. 39
* I would like to thank Kiel Brennan-Marquez, John Fee, Lisa Grow Sun, RonNell Andersen
Jones, David Moore, Benjamin Johnson, Saikrishna Prakash, Brett Scharffs, Mark Shawhan,
Steven D. Smith, and John Welch for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Special thanks go to Fred Gedicks, whose suggestions led to the paper’s current form.

1

HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2015

IV. THE NEW SEPARATIONISM : A N ARROW CONCEPTION OF
THE “C HURCH ” ................................................................... 40
A. Restricting Aid to Religious Institutions .......................... 41
B. Direct Aid: The Lemon and Nyquist Approach ................ 44
C. Direct Aid and Religious Speech: Modern Version ............. 48
V. THE NEW SEPARATIONISM : RECOGNIZING “THE
INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE CHOICE ” ..................................... 49
A. The Theoretical Possibility, and Practical Necessity, of a
Middle Ground ............................................................. 50
B. Expanding the Middle Ground; Shrinking
Separationism ............................................................... 55
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF SEPARATIONISM .............. 59
I. INTRODUCTION
Separation of church and state is supposed to be dead, or at least
dying. It became the guiding principle of the Supreme Court’s
religion jurisprudence in the 1940s, increased in importance through
the 1970s until it dominated the Court’s religion jurisprudence, and
then began a slow decline in the 1980s as the conservative Justices
exploited its historical and conceptual weaknesses to tear it down. In
its place, the Court has erected a neutrality regime that allows
government both to regulate and to subsidize religion so long as it
does so for secular reasons and remains religiously neutral.
Most discussion of separationism assumes the above narrative,
and for good reason. It accurately captures the broad trends of the
Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence and successfully explains
them in both doctrinal and political terms. Yet there remain aspects
of the Court’s religion jurisprudence that fit this narrative
awkwardly, if at all—aspects highlighted by the Court’s decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,
which was both unanimous and thoroughly separationist.
Because scholars lack a consensus understanding of separationism
as a concept, they have not fully appreciated the ways in which the
separationism of the 1970s differed from the separationism that
preceded it. They have also not noticed that the ways in which the
Court’s jurisprudence today, whether it uses the word “separation”
or not, resembles the separationism that guided the Court’s religion
2
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jurisprudence in its earlier decades. It is a separationism at once new
and very old.
The common thread running through this history is the Court’s
concern for the development of religious belief free from
government involvement or interference. In Free Exercise
jurisprudence, this concern has led to special protections for
individual religious belief, religious speech, and organizations that
teach religious principles. In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it
has led to a requirement that any government action benefitting
religious people or organizations must have a non-religious purpose
and must be religiously neutral, whether they are distributed to
religious organizations directly or through the free choice of private
parties. The abandonment of the 1970s’ approach to separationism
has not been a repudiation of separationism itself, but of a particular
approach to separationism—one that was only ascendant for perhaps
two decades, one based on dubious assumptions and leading to
untenable outcomes.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II elaborates on the
traditional narrative of separationism’s rise and fall before explaining
this narrative’s greatest flaw: its lack of any shared definition of
separationism, which has obscured the separationist character of
certain aspects of the Court’s recent religion jurisprudence—in
particular, the committed separationism of Hosanna-Tabor. Part III
traces the contours of this new separationism in Free Exercise
doctrine, tying it to the Court’s early Free Exercise separationism
and distinguishing both of them from the separationism of Sherbert
and Yoder.
Parts IV and V investigate the Court’s new separationism in one
aspect of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, namely, aid to
religious organizations. Part IV argues that the end of the
“pervasively sectarian” doctrine and of the Court’s efforts to ban aid
that can be put to religious purposes, often considered signs of
separationism’s decline, are in fact consistent with its early
separationist jurisprudence and a departure only from problematic
doctrines articulated in the 1970s. Part V makes the same argument
with respect to the Court’s willingness to allow indirect aid to
religious organizations, or in other words, aid distributed by the free
choice of private individuals. Part VI concludes.
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II. THE FLAWED STORY OF SEPARATIONISM’S FALL
The conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court has
repudiated separationism consists of two broadly shared
understandings. First, the conventional wisdom understands the
Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence from 1940 until 1980 as a
continuous effort—if sometimes a timid and confused one—to build
a wall that would separate government and religion as much as
possible. Second, it sees the Court’s religion jurisprudence since
1980 as abandoning this effort and dismantling the wall.
Variations on this basic narrative are expressed or assumed in the
work of numerous legal scholars and other commentators. To some
commentators, it is a happy story: separationism was incoherent to
begin with, 1 or anti-egalitarian, 2 or anti-religious, 3 or just a pointless
barrier to government subsidies of valuable private schools and
charities. 4 To others, it is a tragedy: separationism protected religious
liberty, 5 reduced religious strife, kept government out of the inner
workings of religious organizations, 6 and advanced, however
imperfectly, the ideal of government based on public reason in which
all citizens can participate. But, happy or sad, the erection and
dismantling of a wall of separation is the story most commentators
assume when they discuss the subject, with only a few questioning
whether recent doctrinal changes might actually be consistent with
the separation of church and state, 7 or whether the Supreme Court
remains committed to some aspects of separationism. 8

1. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
(2007).
2. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008).
3. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984).
4. Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Co-operation with Faithbased Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997).
5. Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance
Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2002) (“Neutrality has
emerged victorious from the doctrinal fray while separationism, which has been on the ropes
for two decades, is apparently down for the count.”).
6. William P. Marshall, Remembering the Values of Separatism and State Funding of
Religious Organizations (Charitable Choice): To Aid is Not Necessarily to Protect, 18 J.L. &
POL. 479 (2002).
7. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 46, 48 (1997).
8. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
230 (1994).
THE CONSTITUTION
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The following sections serve three purposes. First, Section II.A
summarizes the conventional narrative in more detail. Then Section
II.B argues that the conventional narrative overstates the extent to
which the Supreme Court has abandoned separationism. In
particular, it argues that Hosanna-Tabor was a perfect test case for
the conventional wisdom that neutrality now dominates the Court’s
religion jurisprudence—a test case that separationism resoundingly
won. Finally, Section II.C argues that the reason scholars have not
universally appreciated the Supreme Court’s continued separationist
commitments is that scholars lack a universally shared understanding
of what separationism is. This Article tries to ameliorate this problem
by listing a few assumptions common to all understandings of
separationism and calling attention to the key issue on which they
differ: their definition of the church from which the state needs to
be separated.
A. The Conventional Narrative
Although the phrase “separation between church and State” first
appeared in a Supreme Court opinion in 1878, 9 histories of the
Court’s separationism usually begin in the 1940s with the
incorporation of the Religion Clauses. In the Jehovah’s Witnesses
cases 10 and United States v. Ballard, 11 the Court began establishing a
religious sphere protected from government influence—or, as the
Court put it in Cantwell v. Connecticut, establishing a “shield
[beneath which] many types of life, character, opinion and belief can
develop unmolested and unobstructed.” 12 In Everson v. Board of
Education, the Court determined that the government must abstain
from promoting religion as well as from interfering with it, and
Cantwell’s shield became a wall. 13
In the following decades, the Court continued to invoke the idea
of separation and the wall metaphor to limit government interaction

9. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
10. See generally Patrick J. Flynn, “Writing their Faith into the Laws of the Land”:
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Supreme Court’s Battle for the Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause,
1939–1945, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2004).
11. United States. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
13. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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with religion under both Religion Clauses. 14 Yet (the narrative goes)
the Court’s separationism was fickle and inconsistent even in its
golden age. In Everson itself, the Court declared in emphatic tones
that it “could not approve the slightest breach” in the wall of
separation, while refusing in the same paragraph to strike down a
subsidy for parochial students’ bus fares 15—leading Justice Jackson to
remark that the Court, “whispering ‘I will ne’er consent,’—
consented.” 16 In the Court’s first Establishment Clause case after
Everson, it forbade schools from allowing private religious instruction
on campus during school time, 17 only to permit a nearly identical
program four years later. 18
Nevertheless, the Court’s separationism grew stricter with time,
and in the 1960s and 1970s, it articulated general statements of the
requirements of the Religion Clauses that were strictly separationist.
In 1963’s Sherbert v. Verner and 1972’s Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court
declared that laws may not burden religious exercise unless doing so
is justified by a “compelling state interest.” 19 In 1971, the Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman held that no government action is permissible
unless its primary purpose is secular, its primary effect neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and the action avoids excessive
entanglement between government and religion. 20 In the following
decade, the Court used this three-prong test to strictly limit

14. E.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 344
U.S. 94, 109 (1952) (Free Exercise); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (Establishment).
15. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
16. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ROGER
K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 363 (1994) (“[Justice Black’s majority opinion in Everson] drew
criticism from all quarters. Black’s rhetoric and dicta contrasted too sharply with his conclusion
and holding to satisfy anyone.”).
17. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 203.
18. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (majority distinguishing McCollum based
on whether the religious instruction took place on school property); id. at 315 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (dissenters arguing that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with McCollum).
For a history of the two decisions, see James E. Zucker, Note, Better a Catholic than a
Communist: Reexamining McCollum v. Board of Education and Zorach v. Clauson, 93 VA. L.
REV. 2069 (2007) (arguing that the shift from McCollum to Zorach can largely be explained by
a growing fear of atheism and communism).
19. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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government aid to religious schools 21 and to strike down Ten
Commandments displays in public schools. 22
By 1980, separationism seemed ascendant, and it had become
identified with the set of issues most people still associate with it
today: keeping religious exercises out of public schools, limiting
subsidies to religious private schools, restricting government
religious speech, and so forth. In Free Exercise jurisprudence,
separationist principles supported doctrines that provided—in
principle, at least—robust protection for religious conscience and for
churches’ self-governance. The Court seemed committed to the idea
that government and religion should influence each other as little
as possible.
But already the cracks were appearing, and they grew quickly.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Court stepped back from its broad
separationist commitments on several controversial fronts:

 Increased aid to religious organizations. In 1973’s

Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, the Court
determined that if aid to a religious organization could be
put to religious purposes, it was impermissible. 23 But it
quickly became clear that the Court would not enforce its
rule. Within ten years, the Court had approved a direct cash
subsidy to religious schools, 24 narrowed its standing doctrine
to prevent some government support for religious
institutions from ever being challenged in court, 25 and
upheld tax deductions for religious school tuition—despite
having struck down tax credits for religious school tuition in
Nyquist. 26 In 1995 the Court held that government subsidies
to religious groups are actually constitutionally mandatory in
some circumstances, 27 and in 2002 it all but overturned

21. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772–73
(1973) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13)).
22. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13).
23. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
24. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
25. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
26. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756.
27. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Nyquist, allowing states to subsidize religious school tuition
through religion-neutral voucher programs. 28

 The erosion of the Lemon test. Though Lemon was a

religious school subsidy case, it presented itself as a general
statement of the requirements of the Establishment Clause. 29
Nevertheless, the Court never treated it as such, and its
importance has declined as the Court has repeatedly chosen
not to apply it, choosing instead to decide cases based on
“history and tradition,” 30 the Free Speech Clause, 31 or Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test. 32 Eventually Lemon’s
influence grew so small that one majority opinion attempted
to jettison its crucial injunction against church-state
entanglements, 33 and another dismissed its three-prong test
as “no more than helpful signposts.” 34

 The collapse of the compelling interest test. Separationism in

the Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence met a similar fate, as
the Court never applied Sherbert’s compelling interest test as
broadly as it seemed to demand. The Court continued to use
it to require states to give employment compensation to
people who rejected work for religious reasons, 35 but with
the exception of Yoder, the Court never used the compelling
interest test to require religious exemptions in any other
context. 36 In some contexts, the Court concluded that the

28. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661–62 (2002) (“[W]e now hold that
Nyquist does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the program here,
offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to religion.”).
29. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602 (1971).
30. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
31. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
32. The endorsement test first appeared in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). It was later cited in a number of majority or plurality opinions, for
example Board of Education v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), and Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
33. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (noting that “[n]ot all entanglements,
of course, have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion”). But see Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at
314 (after Agostini, still referring to Lemon as a “three factor” test).
34. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 741 (1973)).
35. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136,
146 (1987).
36. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–83 (claiming
that “[w]e have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test
except the denial of unemployment compensation” and supporting this claim with a list of the
Court’s Free Exercise precedents). Michael McConnell sharply (and accurately) criticizes
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burden on religious exercise was justified by a compelling
state interest, 37 while in others it concluded that Sherbert and
Yoder did not apply. 38 Eventually the Court concluded that
Sherbert only applied to laws that are not “neutral and
generally applicable,” 39 leaving most burdens on religious
exercise subject to no more than rational basis review.
This decline of separationism has been explained in a number of
ways. To some, it is the work of the religious right: 40 the school
prayer decisions have always been unpopular with voters, 41 so the
Republican Party took advantage of their unpopularity 42 and
appointed judges who would work to overturn those decisions. To
others, it is a reflection of problems inherent in separationism itself,
the two most common complaints being that the Court’s
Smith’s use of precedent, but the examples he uses to counter the Court’s claim fall into three
categories: unemployment cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Hobbie, 480 U.S.
136, and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); cases in
which the Free Exercise claim failed, like Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of
California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), and Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490
U.S. 680 (1989); and finally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the only nonunemployment case in which a claim under Sherbert’s compelling interest test persuaded the
Court. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1990).
37. The Court’s compelling interests included the following: Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (“interest in procuring . . . manpower” for the military); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982) (interest in administering Social Security);
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699–700 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 260) (interest in “a sound
tax system”).
38. The Court concluded that the compelling interest test should not apply to the
following: Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (military dress regulations);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1986) (mandatory issuance of social security numbers);
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988) (the
government’s decision concerning where to build roads and harvest timber on public land).
39. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
40. See, e.g., DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 255–82
(2011) (documenting the rise and effects of the conservative “moral majority”); Lupu, supra
note 8, at 237 (associating the decline of separationism with “the Reagan-Bush years” and the
conservative “program of putting an end to ‘judicial activism’”) (quoting William Wayne
Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1992)).
41. David W. Moore, Public Favors Voluntary Prayer for Public Schools, GALLUP (Aug.
26,
2005),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/18136/public-favors-voluntary-prayer-publicschools.aspx.
42. Every Republican platform since 1972 has included support for prayer in schools.
The complete text of Republican Party platforms since 1856 is available on the website of The
American Presidency Project at the University of California (Santa Barbara),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php.
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separationism was based on incorrect historical claims, 43 and that
separationism is incoherent and incapable of leading to a workable
religion jurisprudence. 44 And finally, some scholars see the Court
abandoning separationism for an ideal of religious neutrality—an
ideal more consistent with contemporary constitutional law’s
dominant focus on equality. 45
But whatever the cause, the conventional narrative of scholars
and commentators is that separationism has declined, that it is
suffering a “lingering death,” 46 that the “wall of separation” is
crumbling, and so on. And as the foregoing narrative makes clear,
there are, unquestionably, reasons for this conventional wisdom.
There can be no question that the Court restricted interactions
between religion and government more in 1975 than it does today,
just as there can be no question that the Court’s use of the word
“separation” and of Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor have declined in
recent decades. 47
But a few scholars have noticed problems with the conventional
narrative. Douglas Laycock has argued that the Court’s relaxed
Establishment Clause doctrine is consistent with separationism
properly understood, while Ira Lupu, who once wrote of
separationism’s “lingering death,” has since acknowledged that
separationism shows signs of lingering life. 48
As these scholars have observed, there remain aspects of the
Court’s religion jurisprudence that do not fit comfortably into the
conventional story. The conventional story has difficulty explaining
why, even in separationism’s heyday, the Court overruled as many
Establishment Clause challenges as it sustained—except perhaps to
say that the Court was never completely committed to the wall even
while it was building it. 49 The story has more difficulty explaining
43. SEHAT, supra note 40, at 235; Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”:
Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L. REV. 443, 450 (2006).
44. See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 23.
45. See, e.g., id. at 24–25; Green, supra note 5, at 1111–12 (“Neutrality has emerged
victorious from the doctrinal fray while separationism, which has been on the ropes for two
decades, is apparently down for the count.”).
46. Lupu, supra note 8, at 230.
47. The last Supreme Court opinion that approvingly cited the “wall” metaphor was
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708–09 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship:
A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002).
49. SEHAT, supra note 40.
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why certain aspects of separationism have survived while others have
not. School prayer is still unconstitutional after half a century of
widespread public opposition to the school prayer cases. 50 It is still
unconstitutional for courts to question the reasonableness of a
person’s religious beliefs even though courts may ask whether a
person’s other beliefs are reasonable. 51 And still, three decades after
separationism supposedly started dying, churches have a degree of
constitutionally protected autonomy that non-religious organizations
lack—autonomy recently affirmed by all nine Justices
in Hosanna-Tabor.
B. Problems with the Narrative: Separationism in Hosanna-Tabor
1. A conflict between separationism and neutrality
In Hosanna-Tabor, the parties tested the conventional wisdom
that separationism has been replaced by neutrality, and separationism
proved quite loudly that it was not dead yet.
The case was a lawsuit brought by a teacher against her church
school employer, alleging that she had been fired in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The school responded that she was
an ordained minister and that her suit was barred by the ministerial
exception, a doctrine developed by the circuit courts that prevented
the application of anti-discrimination laws to churches’ choice of
ministers. 52 This defense was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which
50. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000). A Gallop poll in 2005 found that “76% of Americans favor[ed] a constitutional
amendment . . . allow[ing] voluntary prayer in public schools.” Moore, supra note 41; see also
Michael Lipka, South Carolina Valedictorian Reignites Debate on Prayer in School, PEW RES.
CENTER (June 13, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/13/southcarolina-valedictorian-reignites-debate-on-prayer-in-school/ (“A 2012 Pew Research Center
poll found that 65% of Americans believe liberals have gone too far trying to keep religion out
of schools and government. A smaller, but significant share (48%) think conservative Christians
have gone too far to try to impose religious values on the country.”).
51. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
52. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th
Cir. 1985); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.
1994); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Combs v. Cent. Tex.
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Starkman
v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196
F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000);
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000);
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Elvig v.
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determined that, despite her title, she was not a minister for the
purposes of the exception. 53
It was after the Supreme Court granted certiorari that the case
became a stark conflict between separationism and neutrality.
Surprisingly, the government’s brief focused not on defending the
Sixth Circuit’s narrow definition of “minister,” but rather on
attacking the ministerial exception itself. 54 Less surprisingly, its
arguments against the ministerial exception were all classic neutrality
arguments, all similar to arguments that had persuaded the Court to
abandon separationist doctrines in earlier cases.
The guiding principle of the government’s theory of the case was
that religious people and organizations should be treated the same as
similarly situated non-religious people and organizations. Therefore,
churches are simply expressive associations, and in principle their
right to choose their ministers is no different from a union’s right to
choose its leadership. 55 “[A] secular private school would have no
expressive-association right to discharge a teacher in retaliation for
her assertion of rights under the antidiscrimination statutes,” 56 the
government argued, so why should a religious private school be
treated differently?
Certainly not because of any Free Exercise right. Under
Employment Division v. Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws
may constitutionally interfere with religious practices so long as they
pass the rational basis test, and the employment discrimination laws
at issue in Hosanna-Tabor are neutral and generally applicable. 57 The
church’s only Free Exercise rights at stake were what Smith called
“hybrid” rights 58 that “merged” into its freedom of association
Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008);
Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Cannata v. Catholic
Diocese, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012).
53. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
54. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 28–32, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553) 2011 WL 3319555.
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694
(No. 10-553).
56. Brief for Cheryl Perich at 18, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553)
2011 WL 3380507.
57. Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 54, at 21–29.
58. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
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right. 59 These rights ensured that churches and other expressive
associations would be able to choose leaders who espoused their
expressive message, but the rights would not permit discrimination
unrelated to an association’s message. 60 The rights certainly would
not treat the choice of ministers as a matter from which the
government must remain scrupulously separate.
The government acknowledged that the Establishment Clause
prohibits government from “tak[ing] sides in a religious dispute” 61—
a principle that the Court had used in earlier cases to protect
churches’ autonomy from government interference. 62 But the
government distinguished this principle by appealing again to
neutrality. Citing the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf,
the government argued that the employment discrimination claims
against churches could be resolved based on “neutral principles of
law” and that the Establishment Clause therefore permitted them to
go forward. 63 On every point, the respondents made the sort of
neutrality-based arguments that had persuaded the Court to narrow
its separationist doctrines in the past.
And on every point, the neutrality-based arguments failed
spectacularly. At oral argument, when the government attempted to
explain how churches’ right to choose their ministers was essentially
the same right as labor unions’ right to choose their leaders, Justice
Scalia exploded:
JUSTICE SCALIA: That’s extraordinary.
MS. KRUGER: I —
JUSTICE SCALIA: That is extraordinary.
MS. KRUGER: Well, I —
...

59. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 38.
60. Brief for Cheryl Perich, supra note 56, at 22.
61. Id. at 20.
62. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Kreshik v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
63. Cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (ruling that “the First Amendment
prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine
and practice.”).
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JUSTICE SCALIA: There’s nothing in the Constitution that
explicitly prohibits the government from mucking around in
a labor organization. . . . [B]ut there, black on white in the
text of the Constitution are special protections for religion.
And you say that makes no difference? 64
Justice Scalia was not the only Justice to be bothered by the
argument. Justice Kagan called it “amazing” that the government
would take the position it did, 65 and the Court’s unanimous opinion
declared, “We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion
Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom
to select its own ministers.” 66
The Court rejected the government’s neutrality-based
interpretations of both Religion Clauses, concluding that letting the
suit go forward would violate each Religion Clause independently.
When the government tried to defend its interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause using Smith, its position was rejected by Justice
Scalia, who wrote Smith: “Smith didn’t involve employment by a
church. It had nothing to do with who — who the church could
employ. I don’t — I don’t see how that has any relevance to this.” 67
And the Court’s opinion again agreed with him: “Smith involved
government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present
case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself.” 68 This distinction may be untenable—the Native American
Church’s sacramental use of peyote at issue in Smith was
unquestionably an “internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith
and mission of the church itself”—but whether it is coherent or not,
the outward/inward distinction is a classic separationist move,
distinguishing between a sphere in which government can act freely
and a religious sphere with which the government may not interfere.
On the other hand, the government’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause was simply ignored. The Court’s opinion cited
the church autonomy cases that had forbidden the government to
take sides in religious disputes, concluding that these cases supported
64. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 28–29.
65. Id. at 37.
66. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
67. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 38.
68. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706–07.
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a ministerial exception. 69 It did not mention Jones v. Wolf, the
neutrality-centered case that the government had relied on that
allowed courts to resolve internal church disputes so long as they
could do so using “neutral principles of law.” 70 At every point, the
government’s arguments for neutrality were rejected in favor
of separationism.
2. A thoroughly separationist opinion
The Hosanna-Tabor Court reached strikingly separationist
conclusions, but perhaps more striking was the resemblance between
its reasoning and the reasoning of famous separationist precedents.
This similarity is most obviously visible in the Court’s use of
religion clause history, which shares the following features with the
extensive historical accounts in Everson and Engel:

 A description of some institutional entanglement between
church and state, presumed to be oppressive, that was
common in Europe during or before the colonial period. 71

 The claim that this oppressive entanglement was so

strongly opposed by the American colonists that it was
among the reasons why they left Europe for the
New World. 72

 An extensive focus on James Madison’s views of churchstate relations. 73

 The assumption that because Madison and some of his

contemporaries
opposed
a
particular
church-state
entanglement, that entanglement is banned by the
religion clauses. 74

69. Id. at 704–06. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952) and Serbian E. Orthodox Dioceses for U.S. & Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)).
70. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
71. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10–
11 (1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
72. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702–03; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 10; Engel, 370
U.S. at 427.
73. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703–04; Everson, 330 U.S. at 12; Engel, 370 U.S.
at 428.
74. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1446 (2011) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968))
(calling Madison “the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment”).
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Hosanna-Tabor’s separationist historical narrative does differ
somewhat from its predecessors. It examines several states rather
than focusing exclusively on Virginia, 75 it relies less on the writings of
Thomas Jefferson, and it uses post-ratification history as evidence of
the meaning of the Amendment, an approach usually associated with
the Court’s less separationist decisions like Marsh v. Chambers. 76 But
the basic thrust of the historical argument remains the same: a
church-state entanglement should be invalidated because it
resembles an English practice that Madison and other early
Americans abhorred.
Ultimately, the Court responded to the government’s simple
theory of the case—namely, that churches should be treated the
same as secular expressive associations—with a simple theory of its
own, which can be summarized in a very simple, very
separationist syllogism:
Major premise: The religion clauses prohibit governments
from interfering in church affairs by appointing ministers. 77
Minor premise: Holding a church liable for dismissing a
minister would effectively appoint a minister. 78
Conclusion: The Religion Clauses prohibit the government
from holding a church liable for dismissing a minister, even if
the dismissal violates anti-discrimination laws.
The Court’s whole argument was an attempt to define a proper
sphere for the church and to keep the state separate from it. At no
point did the Court attempt to justify its reasoning in terms of
neutrality or equality; in fact, the two words barely appear in the
opinion 79—even though the case concerned anti-discrimination laws,
a context where one would expect principles of equality to
be paramount.
In summary, the government’s decision to attack the ministerial
exception with neutrality arguments made Hosanna-Tabor an almost
75. Id. at 702–03.
76. Id. at 703–04; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1983).
77. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct.at 703.
78. Id. at 709 (“Perich continues to seek frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay,
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. An award of such relief would
operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no
less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination.”).
79. Id. at 706–07.
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perfect test case for the conventional wisdom that separationism has
been replaced by neutrality. And yet the Court forcefully rejected
every neutrality argument the government made and chose instead
to reach a thoroughly separationist conclusion on thoroughly
separationist grounds, making no effort whatsoever to justify its
decision in terms of neutrality. It is just one case, but Hosanna-Tabor
is nevertheless compelling evidence that the Court remains
committed to some form of separationism.
If the Court does remain committed to separationism, however,
it raises a few questions. Why has separationism’s continued vitality
gone generally (though not universally) unappreciated? And how is it
that the Court can have remained separationist despite having
substantially changed its religion jurisprudence and largely
abandoned the word “separation”?
C. Problems with the Narrative: The Difficulty of
Defining Separationism
1. Separationism’s many meanings
The chief reason that scholars’ understanding of the rise and fall
of separationism is vague and imprecise is that scholars’
understanding of separationism itself has been mostly vague and
imprecise. Douglas Laycock acknowledged this problem recently,
declaring that “the phrase [‘separation of church and state’] has no
agreed core of meaning that will enable anyone to communicate. . . .
[W]e now know that from the phrase alone, without an analysis of
context, we have no idea what people mean by it.” 80
If Laycock means that separationism “has no agreed core of
meaning” among today’s courts and legal scholars, I think he
exaggerates slightly. 81 Clearly, separation of church and state means
that the government may not establish an official church, 82 and
further, nearly everyone associates separationism with a handful of

80. Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667,
1700–01 (2003).
81. If, on the other hand, he means that there is no common meaning of separationism
that has been shared across the several centuries in which the term has been used, then he may
not be exaggerating at all.
82. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 23 (“The wall metaphor . . . captures a basic
institutional difference between the United States and countries such as Great Britain and Iran
that recognize an official national church or faith.”).
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important Supreme Court precedents: Engel v. Vitale, 83 Abington
School District v. Schempp, 84 and so forth. But this core is small, and
its hazy penumbras are vast.
This haziness clears when one examines a list of religion clause
controversies and asks which position on each controversy is
separationist. Are tax exemptions for churches consistent with
separationism? Scholars disagree. 85 Does separationism favor or
oppose religious exemptions from neutral laws? Again, scholars
disagree. 86 Many scholars argue that if a state subsidizes private
school education through tuition vouchers, separationism permits it
to subsidize only non-religious schools, 87 but according to one
eminent scholar, separationism actually requires states to subsidize
religious schools on equal terms with non-religious ones. 88 Scholars
do not even agree on whether separationism is predominantly a
principle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, or whether it
matters in Free Exercise cases as well. 89
Further, when explaining what constitutional purpose
separationism is supposed to serve, scholars give radically different

83. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
84. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
85. Compare Lupu, supra note 8, at 235 (claiming that Walz is consistent with
separationism), with SEHAT, supra note 40, at 259–60 (arguing that Walz is inconsistent
with separationism).
86. Compare Lupu, supra note 8, at 236–37 (arguing that Free Exercise exemptions are
consistent with separationism), with Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 688–89 (1980).
87. E.g., Marshall, supra note 6, at 484 (giving the reasons of “religious integrity,
church-state entanglement, government evaluation of religion, and sectarian divisiveness” as
reasons against vouchers); Melissa Rogers, Traditions of Church-State Separation: Some Ways
They Have Protected Religion and Advanced Religious Freedom and How They Are Threatened
Today, 18 J.L. & POL. 277, 316 (2002) (“[W]hile careful governmental regulation and
oversight is necessary and appropriate in these contexts, it will seriously degrade
religion’s independence.”).
88. Laycock, supra note 7, at 68–73 (explaining Laycock’s theory of “substantive
neutrality,” which he sees as consistent with separationism and which requires religious entities
to be subsidized on equal terms with non-religious ones).
89. Many scholars speak of separationism only in the Establishment Clause context. See,
e.g., Brett G. Scharffs, Protecting Religious Freedom: Two Counterintuitive Dialectics in U.S.
Free Exercise Jurisprudence, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS 285, 304–05
(Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, eds., 2012) (discussing separationism in the Establishment
Clause context but not the Free Exercise context). Others see separationism as a general
statement of proper church-state relations, one that supports particular Free Exercise outcomes
as well. See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 22–50 (explaining separationism’s
implications, including for Free Exercise issues like religious exemptions).
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answers: religious liberty, 90 equality, 91 preserving “the hegemony of
secular ideology in the public square,” 92 or some combination of
these. William Marshall lists no fewer than four values that
separationism serves. 93 John Witte lists five. 94
2. Separationism’s shared core of meaning
Given all of this confusion, it is tempting to dismiss
separationism as a meaningless concept and stop using the term
entirely. But this temptation should be resisted. It is clear that the
phrase “separation of church and state” does not communicate a
single, complete, coherent theory of the Religion Clauses, but it
does make several implicit claims about the proper relationship
between religion and government—claims that, although
increasingly controversial, are broadly shared by authors who
consider themselves separationist.
At its heart, “separation of church and state” is a spatial
metaphor. The core meaning of the verb “to separate” is to put
distance between two objects, “to keep apart or divide, as by an
intervening barrier or space.” 95 Applying a physical, spatial
relationship like separation to abstract concepts like “church” and
“state” entails making assumptions about how the physical concept
maps onto the abstract domain in question, and these assumptions
are the core claims shared by practically all separationist theories.
What are these assumptions? Beginning with the obvious,
separationist theories assume that there is something called “church”
and something called “state.” Further, they assume that “church”
and “state” are things that can in principle be recognized and

90. Green, supra note 5, at 1121 (arguing that the recent reinterpretation of
separationism to serve neutrality is contrary to the historical meaning of the Religion Clauses).
91. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 229 (“With . . . the main lines of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in the latter half of the twentieth century . . . I shall suggest that a good
guide is the idea of equality.”); see also id. at 11 (“[T]here was a brief era when the separation
idea acquired a momentum of its own and things became unbalanced.”); id. at 224–72
(explaining the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence in terms of equality, beginning
with the school prayer cases).
92. Lupu, supra note 8, at 249.
93. Marshall, supra note 6, at 484–90.
94. John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869,
1889–91 (2003).
95. Separate Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
separate?s=t (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
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distinguished from each other, even if the task may be difficult in
practice. Though these insights may seem obvious, they actually
constitute separationism’s first non-trivial claim. The idea that
religious ideas, practices, and institutions can be distinguished from
non-religious ones has increasingly come under attack in both social
scientific and legal literatures. 96 Separationists might respond to this
critique in a variety of ways, but if they wish to separate church and
state, they cannot abandon the idea that there is in fact a church.
A second non-trivial claim implied by the separation metaphor is
that the church not only can be distinguished from the rest of
society, but that it ought to be. In other words, if there are other
entities in society that do not need to be separated from the state,
the church should be treated differently from them. This claim has
also come increasingly under attack in recent years, as scholars have
disputed whether religion merits any sort of “special treatment.” 97
To any theory plausibly claiming to be separationist, the answer must
be “yes.”
Moving our focus from the words “church” and “state” to the
word “separation” yields a third important separationist claim. As
pointed out above, separation is a relationship between two objects
in space, and it is always reciprocal: it is impossible for an object to
be separate from something that is not separate from it. In other
words, to separate X from Y is always to separate Y from X. This
suggests that separationist theories are similarly reciprocal,
advocating both that the state should be protected from church
interference and that the church should be protected from state
interference. 98 Unlike separationism’s first two claims, this claim has
always been controversial, with advocates of greater religious
influence on government complaining (for example) of a “naked

96. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
138–39 (2005) (arguing that it is impossible for courts to define “religion” fairly and
consistently and that the effort to do so will inevitably disadvantage people with nontraditional
or idiosyncratic religious beliefs); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It
Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 807 (2009) (using the difficulty of
defining religion as an argument for abandoning separationism).
97. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 571, 572 (2006).
98. Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (“[T]he
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”)
(emphasis added).
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public square.” 99 Recently, this claim has found new attackers: critics
of religion who want a thoroughly secular state to regulate religious
belief and practice. 100
To summarize, the separationist metaphor expresses three
popular but by no means universally accepted claims:
1. First, that there is something called “church” and
something called “state,” and that church and state can be
distinguished from each other and from the rest of society.
2. Second, that the church ought to be treated differently
from other entities that do not need to be separated from
the state.
3. Third, that church and state should each be protected
from the other, rather than only one of them
being protected.
These three claims are the core of separationism’s meaning and
are shared by all understandings of separationism of which I am
aware. As such, these claims provide a convenient measuring stick for
determining whether a scholar’s theory or a justice’s opinion is
separationist. If all three of these claims play an important role in an
argument, then the argument is structurally separationist, even if, for
whatever reason, the argument’s author chooses to avoid the
word “separation.”
3. The mischief of suppressed assumptions
Identifying these core separationist claims is valuable for another
reason: it calls attention to the key point on which separationist
theories differ, and thus explains both why there has been such
rampant confusion regarding separationism and why the confusion
has sometimes gone unnoticed. This key point of difference is the
definition and nature of the church.
1. If, following the first core claim, the church exists and can
be distinguished from the state and the rest of society, what is
the church and how do we distinguish it?

99. NEUHAUS, supra note 3.
100. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE
OF REASON (2004).
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2. If, following the second and third core claims, the church
should be treated differently from other entities in society,
what is it about the church that merits this special treatment?
Justice Frankfurter alluded to these questions in his McCollum
concurrence: “[A]greement, in the abstract, that the First
Amendment was designed to erect a wall of separation between
church and State, does not preclude a clash of views as to what the
wall separates.” 101 Yet the mischief that unstated assumptions about
the “church” have wrought upon separationist reasoning has not
generally been appreciated. There has been some debate between
those who understand “church” to mean actual churches 102 and
those who think separationism should separate government from
religion more broadly. 103 But this church-as-institutions versus
church-as-religion-generally debate radically understates the
difficulty. “Religion” is a famously amorphous concept, one some
scholars have advocated abandoning entirely, 104 and it is unlikely that
the various advocates of separating government from religion all
have the same idea of “religion” in mind.
To give one of many possible examples, from the nineteenth
century through the 1960s, many Protestant separationists
supported prayer and Bible study in public schools on the grounds
that such practices were not actually religious. 105 To them, “religion”
was synonymous with sectarianism—that is, it consisted primarily of
the beliefs and practices that divide denominations from each
other. 106 Because everyone was assumed to accept prayer and Bible
study, these practices were considered part of “general Christianity”
or the “Judeo-Christian tradition” rather than part of religion, and
they were therefore permitted in schools as a form of moral
education. Today’s courts and scholars are probably unanimous that
101. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
102. See, e.g., Derek H. Davis, Editorial, Separation, Integration, and Accommodation:
Religion and State in America in a Nutshell, 43 J. CHURCH & ST. 5, 9–10 (2001).
103. See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (“The First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is
left free from the other within its respective sphere.”)(emphasis added)).
104. E.g. SULLIVAN, supra note 96, at 138–39.
105. STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
CLASH THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE (2012).
106. This definition was not neutral, of course—that it allowed Protestants but not
Catholics to use public schools for religious education was one of its chief attractions.
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prayer and Bible study are religious practices, but that does not mean
that courts and scholars have any shared understanding of why
prayer and Bible study are religious, or how to distinguish between
religious and non-religious beliefs, symbols, practices, and so forth.
Drawing such a distinction is often extremely difficult, and cases that
turn on the distinction between religion and non-religion still reach
the Court regularly. 107
As a result of this confusion, two people might agree that church
and state ought to be separated, and agree that by “church” they
mean all of religion, and yet lack a common understanding of
“religion” and disagree on the correct outcome of every religion
clause controversy in the last seventy years—possibly without even
noticing their disagreement. On the other hand, they might disagree
in principle about separationism and yet interpret the religion clauses
in very similar ways, possibly without noticing their agreement. And
as I will argue below, the conventional story of separationism’s
decline makes both of these mistakes.
As I will argue in Parts III through V, the conventional story
assumes too much similarity between the Court’s early separationism
and its strict separationism of the 1970s, possibly because the Court
in both eras used separationist rhetoric in its opinions. Further, it
fails to acknowledge the similarities between the Court’s early
separationism and its current approach to the Religion Clauses,
possibly because the Court no longer uses separationist rhetoric as
often as it once did. Nevertheless, that the Court avoids separationist
rhetoric does not mean that it eschews separationist reasoning. Part
III makes this case with respect to the Court’s Free Exercise
jurisprudence, and Parts IV and V make the same case in the more
complicated context of the Establishment Clause.

107. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (challenging a nativity scene in a
city holiday display); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (deciding the constitutionality of a crèche in county courthouse); Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (challenging school district policy requiring
recitation of Pledge of Allegiance); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (challenging
monument inscribed with Ten Commandments on state capitol grounds); McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (deciding constitutionality of Ten Commandments posted in a
county courthouse).
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III. THE NEW FREE EXERCISE SEPARATIONISM: PROTECTING
RELIGIOUS BELIEF
According to the conventional narrative, Free Exercise
separationism aimed to leave every aspect of Americans’ religious
lives as free as possible from government influence, to
“minimiz[e] . . . the government’s influence over personal choices
concerning religious beliefs and practices.” 108 This principle guided
the Court’s most important separationist Free Exercise decisions,
Sherbert and Yoder, which established that government may not
burden religious practices unless doing so is the only way to achieve
a compelling state interest. 109 Protecting religious practice with the
compelling interest test is often presented as an inevitable
implication of the separationist idea, 110 a consummation towards
which the Court’s early separationist decisions were clearly working.
I disagree. The compelling interest test of Sherbert and Yoder was
indeed a flowering of separationist ideas planted in the Court’s
earlier decisions, but it was not the only flower that might have
grown from those seeds. In reasoning from the idea of separation to
the compelling interest test as Yoder applied it, the Court had to
make a crucial and debatable assumption: that the “church” from
which the “state” should be separated includes all religious practices
rather than only some religious practices, or only religious
institutions, or only religious belief.
This Part argues that the Court’s early decisions did not make
this key assumption, and instead focused its separationism specifically
on religious belief and on the practices and institutions through
which individuals develop their religious beliefs. This Part then
describes the problems that arose from the Court’s broad
understanding of the “church” in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, this
Part argues that the Court’s decisions in Smith and Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, which are generally
understood as abandoning Free Exercise separationism for neutrality,
actually had a more subtle effect of dividing Free Exercise
108. Laycock, supra note 7, at 69 (emphasis added) (Esbeck, supra note 4, at 25.
109. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion.”).
110. E.g., Laycock, supra note 7, at 69 (“Minimizing government influence is consistent
with the central meaning of separation—it maximally separates government power and
influence from religious belief and practice.”).
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jurisprudence into two separate doctrinal realms: one governed by
separationism, concerning itself with religious belief and the
institutions and practices that shape belief; and the other governed
by neutrality and protecting other aspects of religion from
government discrimination.
A. From Cantwell to Sherbert: The Narrow Church of Belief
Between 1937 and 1960, the Court laid the foundations of
modern Free Exercise jurisprudence, deciding over two dozen claims
by religious claimants under the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses. 111 Separationism was not the only idea on the Court’s mind
in these cases, but the justices were nevertheless functionally
separationist, delineating a religious sphere within which religion
could exist free of government interference. And the principle that
guided this delineation was that of individuals’ freedom of religious
belief (discussed in III.A.1 below).
But, the Court recognized that, for individuals’ choice of
religious beliefs to be truly free, they must also be free to hear new
ideas, to speak their minds (III.A.2), and to associate with likeminded people (III.A.3). These insights have long been the core of
First Amendment jurisprudence generally, and their application to
Religion Clause controversies has been particularly strict, often
providing greater protection for the formation and spread of
religious beliefs than for non-religious ideas.
However, the freedom to form one’s religious beliefs does not
depend on the freedom to act on those beliefs. It is therefore
unsurprising that the Court’s separationism in this era provided little
protection for what are now often called claims of religious
conscience—that is, claims that a person should not have to obey a
particular law because doing so would be contrary to her religious
beliefs. The Court’s early unwillingness to validate such claims is
discussed in Subsection III.A.4.
1. Protecting belief itself
Few Supreme Court cases in any era have dealt with actual
prohibitions on belief, likely because of the difficulty of prohibiting
111. For a list, see Appendix Three of JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 305 (3d ed. 2011) (listing all “Supreme
Court decisions relating to religious liberty” up to 2010).
AND THE
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belief itself rather than expressions of it. But the Supreme Court’s
early separationism made it clear that the freedom to choose one’s
religious beliefs is absolute—even more protected than the freedom
to choose one’s beliefs in other contexts.
This preferential treatment appears in the Court’s 1944 decision
United States v. Ballard, in which the leaders of a small religious
movement were indicted for fraud on the theory that they had
obtained money from their followers by making dishonest claims to
divine visitations and miraculous healing powers. 112 The Court
permitted the indictment, but—contrary to standard practice in
fraud cases—forbade juries from passing judgment on whether the
defendants’ claims were true or false:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief,
is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to maintain
theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank
heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are
foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot
prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. 113

In addition to protecting believers from inquiries into the
truthfulness or falsity of their religious beliefs, the Court later
protected believers from having to deny their religious belief by
making oaths contrary to it. Because it was difficult to determine
whether such oaths are constitutionally protected statements of
belief, rather than actions that could be freely regulated, protection
on this point was not entirely consistent: in 1945 the Court allowed
Illinois to deny bar membership to applicants who would not swear
to serve in the militia during wartime. 114 But the very next year, the
Court struck down the requirement that candidates for naturalized
citizenship swear to fight for the United States, 115 and the Court’s
approach to oaths contrary to a claimant’s religion has generally

112. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
113. Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
114. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570–73 (1945) (“It is impossible for us to conclude
that the insistence of Illinois that an officer who is charged with the administration of justice
must take an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois’ interpretation of that
oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the principles of religious
freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action . . . .”).
115. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
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followed its famous
Education v. Barnette:

words

in

West

Virginia

Board

of

If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us. 116

This idea—that government may not establish a religious
orthodoxy but must rather allow individuals to form their own
religious opinions—was indeed the “fixed star” of the Court’s
early separationism.
2. The right to preach
Just as democracy depends on free public debate, 117 individuals’
freedom of religious belief cannot be meaningfully exercised if other
individuals cannot preach or otherwise spread their own beliefs. This
freedom to preach and proselytize was the subject of a large majority
of the Court’s religion decisions in the early separationist era,
decisions that formed the basis of modern Free Speech law. 118
It is unnecessary to go into detail about these decisions. It
suffices to say that in order to protect the free development of
religious belief, the Court established constitutional protections for
believers to proselytize from door to door, 119 solicit funds for
religious purposes, 120 distribute religious literature, 121 display

116. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (striking down Maryland’s requirement that state officers
declare a belief in God because “neither a State nor the Federal Government can
constitutionally force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
117. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (3d ed. 2004).
118. By my count, the Court decided an astonishing twenty-two cases concerning
proselytism or other public preaching between 1938 and 1953—about 1.5 cases per year—
from Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), to Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953).
119. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943).
120. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
121. Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Lovell, 303 U.S. 444.
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supposedly sacrilegious films, 122 and hold religious parades and
public assemblies. 123
Many of these protections were grounded in the Free Speech
and Press Clauses, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, but with
respect to the cases’ religious claimants, the purpose and effect of the
decisions was clearly separationist. Legislatures could not use
censorship to protect favored religious beliefs from criticism, 124 they
could not give executive officials discretion that effectively allowed
them to block the teaching of disfavored religious views, 125 and they
could not tax the delivering of sermons and distribution of religious
literature except to recoup the public expenses occasioned by the
religious speech. 126
In the language of Cantwell, the “essential characteristic” of
these new constitutional rights is “that under their shield many types
of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and
unobstructed.” 127 Effectively, these decisions made religious speech
part of the “church” from which government needed to be kept
scrupulously separate.
3. Church autonomy
Finally, the Court’s early decisions concerning separation of
church and state protected actual churches as well as individuals’
beliefs and religious speech. Faced with a New York law that
transferred authority over New York’s Russian Orthodox
congregations away from the Patriarch of Moscow, the Court
determined that to intervene in church affairs in such a manner
“violate[d] our rule of separation between church and state.” 128
Churches should have “power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy . . . must now be
122. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
123. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
124. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495.
125. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 418 (1943); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308.
126. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a tax); Follett v. Town
of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating a tax); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953) (permitting license fees that pay for city expenses incurred because of the
constitutionally protected activity).
127. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
128. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952).
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said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free
exercise of religion against state interference.” 129 As in United States
v. Ballard, the Free Exercise Clause gave religious claimants
preferential treatment over non-religious ones. 130
4. Minimal protection for religious practice
As the foregoing discussion shows, the Court—by espousing
doctrines protecting individuals’ rights to believe, preach, and
assemble, as well as churches’ right to choose their representatives—
marked off a robust church sphere including most of the key
practices and institutions through which individuals form their
religious beliefs. 131 But outside this sphere, the Court showed little
interest in accommodating religious practice, acknowledging in
Cantwell that “the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be.” 132
This contrast can be seen most clearly in the flag salute cases,
Gobitis and Barnette. When the Court understood the Jehovah’s
Witnesses to be requesting an exception from a law regulating
conduct, it rejected their claim by a vote of eight to one:
“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs.” 133 But three years later the Court granted an identical claim
because it no longer understood the flag salute laws as regulations of
conduct. Instead, it saw them as an effort to enforce belief in a
political orthodoxy. 134 The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs did not
permit them to act contrary to the law, but they could not be
required to abandon the beliefs themselves.

129. Id. at 116; see also Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969).
130. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
131. The most glaring omission—parents’ religious education of their children—had
already received protection in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), and would gain further protection still in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
132. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303–04.
133. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
134. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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The Court repeated this process in two cases concerning oaths to
serve in the military. In 1945’s In re Summers, the Court allowed
Illinois to deny bar membership to those who would not swear to
join the militia in time of war. 135 The Court had already rejected the
claim that there was a constitutional right not to join the military; 136
why should there then be a constitutional right not to promise to
join the military? 137
Yet the very next year, the Court concluded that a citizenship
application should not be denied merely because the applicant was a
religious pacifist. 138 The Court’s decision was statutory rather than
constitutional, but it still invoked the First Amendment and
recharacterized oaths promising to serve in the military as a matter of
belief, not conduct: “Freedom of thought, which includes freedom
of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. The test oath is
abhorrent to our tradition.” 139
These cases demonstrate how sharply the Court distinguished
between claims to constitutional protection for religious belief and
claims to protection for religious practice—in effect showing that
belief was part of the church from which government needed to be
separated, and that practice was not.
5. Summary
At no point in this era did the Court give anything like a
complete theoretical account of its separationism, with definitions of
the church and state and a comprehensive statement of why this set
of religious practices, and no others, should be protected. It also did
not always take care to show how its decisions fit together; in
particular, its crucial church autonomy decision in Kedroff rests more
on the mere words “separation between church and state” than on
any effort to show how the Free Exercise principles articulated in
earlier cases applied to churches’ internal governance structures. Nor
did the Court always understand its decisions in the precise light I
am presenting them in here. For example, Cantwell presented itself
as a decision concerning religious conduct rather than (as I have

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

30

In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570–72 (1945).
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261–65 (1934).
Summers, 325 U.S. at 572.
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
Id. at 69 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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argued) a decision about religious speech and therefore more closely
related to belief than to conduct. 140
Yet in retrospect, the Court’s decisions make its goals very clear.
Because the Court wanted to protect individuals’ freedom to choose
their own religious beliefs, it forbade governments from enforcing
orthodoxies, whether through pledges and oaths or through jury
determinations that certain religious beliefs are false. Further,
because individuals are not free to choose religious beliefs they have
never heard, the Court forbade governments from interfering with
the teaching of religious beliefs or with churches’ choice of clergy to
formulate and preach their religious beliefs. On the other hand, the
Court refused to strike down laws that burdened religious conduct
unless they interfered with the formulation or expression of belief. At
every point, the Court’s Free Exercise decisions aimed to separate
the state from the church, as the Court understood it—that is, to
separate the state from the set of institutions and practices necessary
for the free development of individual belief.
B. Seeger and Yoder: The Impossibly Broad Church
The narrow church of belief had the advantage of relative
clarity—institutions and practices necessary for the free development
of religious belief were protected, and other institutions and
practices were not—but there were reasons to be unsatisfied with its
narrow scope. In particular, “general law[s] not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs” 141 often did in fact
restrict religious beliefs through their disparate impact, burdening
people who held one set of beliefs much more than people who held
other beliefs. The Court noticed this problem in 1961’s Braunfeld v.
Brown, in which Jewish business owners complained that because of
their Sabbatarian beliefs, Sunday closing laws effectively forced them
to stay closed for two days per week, possibly destroying their
businesses’ economic viability. 142
The Court denied the business owners relief, as one would have
expected from its earlier decisions, but the plurality’s reasoning

140. I am not alone in this interpretation. Cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (claiming that Cantwell was not merely about “religiously
motivated action” but also about free speech and a free press).
141. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
142. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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departed from its treatment of religiously motivated conduct in
Gobitis and Summers. The opinion did apply classic narrow-church
separationist principles to the case, quoting Jefferson’s “wall of
separation” letter and appealing to the well-worn distinction
between belief and conduct, concluding that it would be impossible
to invalidate every conduct-regulating law “that may in some way
result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to
others because of the special practices of the various religions.” 143 But
the Court innovated by going on to suggest that if the state could
have achieved its goal of establishing a day of rest without burdening
conduct “in accord with” or “demanded by” the claimants’ religious
beliefs, then the burden on their religious practice would have
been impermissible. 144
Two years later, Braunfeld’s suggestion became Sherbert’s
compelling interest test, and the Court established that the sphere of
protected religious practices now included all “conduct prompted by
religious principles” that did not “pose[] some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order.” 145 All other religious practices would
be protected by the compelling interest test, and it seemed that the
Court was actually willing to take the test seriously. Braunfeld may
have deferred to the state legislature on the crucial question of
whether the state’s interest might be achieved by some less
burdensome means, 146 but Sherbert showed no such deference. 147
If Sherbert had been consistently followed, it would have meant a
massive expansion of the church that separationism was committed
to protect. The set of practices and institutions necessary to allow for
the free formation of religious belief is fairly limited—preaching,
reading, publishing, associating—but the set of actions that might be
prompted by religious belief can include literally anything: if anyone
could possibly want to do a thing, someone might want to do it for
religious reasons.

143. Id. at 606.
144. Id. at 603–04.
145. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
146. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608 (“[I]n [a previous case], we examined several suggested
alternative means by which it was argued that the State might accomplish its secular goals
without even remotely or incidentally affecting religious freedom. We found there that a State
might well find that those alternatives would not accomplish bringing about a general day of
rest. We need not examine them again here.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
147. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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The breadth of this nearly infinite religious sphere was only
expanded by the Court’s general policy of treating all individual
conscientious belief as religious principle whether it is conventionally
religious or not. Prior to Sherbert, in United States v. Seeger, the
Court had been willing to grant conscientious objector status based
on “sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God” of conventional
believers. 148 Quoting theologian Paul Tillich, the Court suggested
that religion is whatever happens to be a person’s “ultimate
concern, . . . what [she] take[s] seriously without any reservation.” 149
The Court would later allow for similar breadth in applying the
compelling interest test, holding that a Free Exercise claim could be
based on a person’s own interpretation of his religious principles
rather than needing to derive from the consensus of a
faith community. 150
Further, if this nearly infinite religious sphere were actually
protected by the full force of the compelling interest test, it would
have had an immense impact on American law, potentially requiring
strict scrutiny in a breathtaking number of cases involving
government actions that, on their face, had nothing to do with
religion. Faced with the prospect of applying such a demanding test
to such a broad religious sphere, the Court quickly found ways not
to apply the Sherbert test as broadly or as strictly as Sherbert had
suggested. 151 But in the end, this was not enough, and the potential
unruliness of the Sherbert regime led the Court to abandon
Sherbert’s broad understanding of the religious sphere.
C. Smith, Lukumi, and Hosanna-Tabor: Back to the Church of Belief
Smith is sometimes presented as the end of Free Exercise
separationism, and Lukumi as separationism’s replacement by ideas
of religious equality and neutrality. The decisions themselves provide
good reasons for this interpretation: neither majority opinion
mentions the separation of church and state, both give the idea of
neutrality a prominent place in their reasoning, and Lukumi is

148.
149.
150.
151.

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
Id. at 187.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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obviously concerned with the problem of religious discrimination. 152
And, of course, the decisions turned separationist Free Exercise
jurisprudence on its head, radically curtailing the circumstances in
which the compelling interest test protects religious practice and
thus leaving religion much more open to government interference
than the broad-church separationism of the 1970s would
have permitted.
There are, however, two problems with concluding on this basis
that Free Exercise separationism is dead. The first is that separation
and neutrality are not mutually exclusive concepts; indeed, each
implies some form of the other. 153 In order to be separated from
religious belief, the state must treat all religious beliefs equally. On
the other hand, in order to be neutral among religions, the state
must avoid establishing religious orthodoxies or, in other words, it
must be separated from matters of religious belief. Further, even if
the Court’s version of separationism and its version of neutrality are
ultimately at odds, that does not mean that the two doctrines cannot
coexist in its jurisprudence. The Court may consider separationism
appropriate in one context and neutrality appropriate in another,
which is perhaps the most straightforward way to understand the
conflict between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor.
The second problem is that Smith and Lukumi, important as
they are, are still just two cases, both dealing with criminal
prohibitions of religious rituals. Though they presented themselves
in sweeping terms as general statements of the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause, so too did Sherbert and Yoder, and yet the Smith
Court easily narrowed those cases almost to nothing when it
thought their holdings should not be applied in a new context. The
Court seems to be giving Smith a gentler version of the same
treatment: when the Court has been asked to apply Smith in new
contexts—distribution of religious literature 154 and churches’ choice

152. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
153. Cf. Green, supra note 5 (pointing out that neutrality can be a tool of separationism
or separationism can be a tool of neutrality and arguing that separation, not neutrality, should
be the dominant idea).
154. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
159, 169 (2002) (reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision to uphold an ordinance because it was
neutral and generally applicable).

34

HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

The Very Old New Separationism

of their ministers 155—it has refused, finding reasons to grant relief to
religious claimants that Smith and Lukumi would have denied.
To state this point more precisely, the protected church sphere
prior to Smith and Lukumi included religious belief, the expression
of religious belief, institutions that spread religious belief, and
actions prompted by religious belief. Smith and Lukumi dealt only
with the last category—actions prompted by religious belief—leaving
it an open question whether separationism still protected the other
aspects of the church.
The purpose of this Section is to argue that the Court retains
some commitment to using separationist principles to protect these
other aspects of the church, demonstrating the Court’s continuing
commitment to protecting religious belief (III.C.1), religious
expression (III.C.2), and the autonomy of religious institutions
(III.C.3). It will also argue that much of the Court’s concern with
religious discrimination is perfectly consistent with its
new separationism.
1. The sharp distinction between belief and conduct
Smith is often understood as turning Free Exercise jurisprudence
into a bare equality regime, 156 but its actual effect was to reject
Sherbert’s expansion of the protected church and return to the
narrow, belief-centric church of its early separationist cases. This can
be seen most clearly in its adoption of the stark distinction between
belief and conduct that the Court had originally articulated in its first
Free Exercise case, Reynolds v. United States, 157 and recognized again
in Cantwell and subsequent cases. Though Smith sharply reduced
the protection afforded to religious conduct, it affirmed that belief
remains absolutely protected:
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus,
the First Amendment obviously excludes all governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such. The government may not
compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression of
religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities
on the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend its power

155. See discussion of Hosanna-Tabor supra Part II.C.
156. See discussion supra Part II.A.
157. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority
or dogma. 158

This is an eminently separationist sentiment, entirely consistent
with the argument from Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation”
letter that “the legitimate powers of government reach actions only,
& not opinions.” 159
Smith’s special solicitude for religious beliefs can also be seen in
its reasoning. Perhaps the chief reason Smith rejects Sherbert’s
compelling interest test is the fear that believers will be able to
excuse themselves from whatever laws they wish—and among the
chief reasons for this fear is the Court’s respect for religious beliefs,
which prohibits it from interrogating religious beliefs to distinguish
between important and unimportant practices. 160 It is even possible
to understand Smith’s treatment of Sherbert in this light: to Smith,
the real problem with denying unemployment compensation to
Adell Sherbert may not have been that it burdened her religious
practice, but that it involved a determination that her religious
beliefs were not “good cause” for rejecting potential employment. 161
Further, this special concern for religious belief can be seen in
the way Smith and Lukumi conceive of the Free Exercise Clause’s
protection for religious conduct. According to these cases, laws
burdening religious conduct are constitutionally suspect only if they
are not neutral and generally applicable—that is, if their purpose is to
harm a particular religion or if their burden falls primarily on
religious claimants. 162 According to Smith,
a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it
sought to ban . . . acts or abstentions only when they are engaged
in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that
they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example,

158. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802) in 57
LIB. CONGRESS INFO. BULL., June 1998, http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
160. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87.
161. See id. at 884.
162. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–42
(1993) (neutrality analysis, focused on purpose); id. at 542–46 (general applicability analysis,
concerned with disparate impact).
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to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship
purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf. 163

Regulations burdening religious conduct are unconstitutional if
their purpose or predominant effect is government antagonism
toward particular religious beliefs. This shows a special degree of
concern for religious beliefs that the Court does not show for other
types of belief—for example, hate crimes legislation does not become
constitutionally suspect by targeting the beliefs of racists.
2. The freedom to preach
The Court’s continued commitment to the free dissemination of
religious beliefs is somewhat less obvious, having become obscured
by its increasing commitment to the free dissemination of all
beliefs—claims that would once have been brought simultaneously
under the Free Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise Clauses are
now often decided solely on the basis of Free Speech doctrine. 164
Nevertheless, the Court has continued to recognize that
religious speech merits constitutional protection, possibly more
protection than at least some other forms of speech. In Smith itself,
religious speech was recognized as a hybrid right—that is, a form of
religious conduct that merited extra constitutional protection
because it implicated another constitutional provision (free speech)
in addition to the Free Exercise Clause. 165 The idea of hybrid rights is
controversial, 166 and its influence on subsequent cases has been
somewhat limited, 167 but it is interesting to note that all three of the
potential hybrid rights recognized in Smith—religious speech, the
right of parents to direct their children’s religious education, and the
right of believers to form religious associations—have to do with the
dissemination and inculcation of religious beliefs. 168

163. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78.
164. E.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (the
words “free exercise” do not appear in any of the Court’s opinions, and the word “religion”
appears once).
165. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
166. See Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1494–96 (2010) (quickly summarizing the debate over hybrid rights).
167. Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573,
573–74 (2003).
168. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
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Another indication of the importance of religious speech came in
2002’s Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village
of Stratton, in which the Court relied on its long history of
protecting door-to-door proselytism to invalidate a city ordinance
because of the burden it placed on advocacy of both religious and
nonreligious causes. John Witte and Joel Nichols understand this
decision as affirming Cantwell’s standard of intermediate scrutiny for
laws burdening religious speech. 169
At the very least, however, the Court has recognized that
religious speech deserves as much protection as other speech.
Widmar v. Vincent, 170 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 171 and Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of
Virginia 172 are generally known as anti-separationist cases, 173 but
when seen from a Free Exercise perspective, they have an important
separationist effect: protecting the dissemination of religious beliefs
by requiring the government to give religious speech access to the
same public fora available for non-religious speech.
3. Church autonomy
The final area in which the Court has proved itself still
committed to narrow-church separationism is churches’ right to
govern themselves. As discussed in Section II.C above, the Court
showed this aspect of its commitment most clearly in HosannaTabor, where it held that Smith’s rule of neutrality applied only to
“outward physical acts” and not to “internal church decision[s] that
affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself.” 174
Hosanna-Tabor’s concern for the formation of religious belief
was explicit in the Court’s opinion:
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of
their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon
more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes
with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of
169. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 111, at 136–37.
170. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
171. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
172. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
173. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1.
174. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707
(2012) (emphasis added).
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control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape
its own faith and mission through its appointments. 175

This concern for the free formation of religious belief, as well as
the distinction drawn between belief and practice, corresponds
closely to the Court’s early separationism, which protected actions
and institutions necessary for the formation of religious belief but
not those that are merely expressions of religious belief. 176
4. Summary
Although much about the evolution of the Court’s Free Exercise
jurisprudence fits the conventional narrative of a shift from
separationism to equality, the Court continues to provide special
protections for religious belief and for the institutions and practices
necessary for the free formation of religious belief.
This can be seen in Smith’s insistence that regulation of religious
belief is absolutely prohibited, in Lukumi’s prohibition of laws
targeting conduct motivated by religious belief, and in the
continuing influence of Ballard, all of which demonstrate that the
Court still considers religious belief deserving of special
constitutional status. It can also be seen in Watchtower’s heightened
scrutiny of laws burdening religious speech and in the Court’s
insistence on keeping public fora open to religious speech, both of
which demonstrate that the free dissemination of religious ideas
remains an important constitutional goal. And it can be seen very
clearly in Hosanna-Tabor, which drew a sharp distinction between
physical actions motivated by religious teachings and decisions by
churches that affect the content of their teachings.
In short, the Court has not abandoned separationism in its Free
Exercise jurisprudence. It has merely narrowed the church it aims
to protect.

175. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasis added); see also id. at 713 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“A religious body’s control over [its ministers] is an essential component of its
freedom to speak in its own voice, both to its own members and to the outside world. The
connection between church governance and the free dissemination of religious doctrine has deep
roots in our legal tradition . . . .”) (emphasis added).
176. See supra Part III.A.
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IV. THE NEW SEPARATIONISM: A NARROW CONCEPTION OF
THE “CHURCH”
Free Exercise jurisprudence is a useful context for explaining the
expansion and subsequent contraction of the Court’s understanding
of the church because the changes in the church’s scope are so easily
visible in the doctrine: prior to Smith, actions motivated by belief
were part of the “church”; in Smith, the “church” shrank and
stopped including them. But the Establishment Clause is more
strongly associated with separationism, and changes in Establishment
Clause doctrine are the primary reason most people assume that
separationism is in decline. If the apparent decline of separationism is
in fact a narrowing of the Court’s understanding of the church, then
this narrowing should be able to explain changes in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence as well as Free Exercise.
However, the way the shrinking church has influenced
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is somewhat more complicated
than its influence on Free Exercise Clause cases—in part because
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is just more complicated than
Free Exercise 177—and its similarities to the Court’s early separationist
decisions are less direct. Whereas the Court’s narrower conception of
the church has led its Free Exercise doctrine more or less back to
where it was before the 1960s, the Court’s new Establishment
Clause doctrine is more like a variation on an earlier theme, a new
development of ideas that were present in early separationist
decisions but rejected by the strict separationism of the 1970s.
The Sections that follow trace this story through the Supreme
Court’s direct aid cases, while Part V examines indirect aid cases.
Section IV.A argues that the Court’s early Establishment Clause
separationism proposed a number of ways of defining the church (for
direct aid purposes) without settling on one. Section IV.B argues
that the Court’s strict separationism of the 1970s employed a
broadened understanding of the church to strike down aid that the
earlier separationism might have permitted. Finally, Section IV.C
argues that the Court has since abandoned this effort to broaden the
church, and that its new, narrower conception of the church has led
to a loosening of restrictions on aid to religious institutions.

177. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 111, at 170 (“The Court’s establishment clause
cases are even more confusing than [its] free exercise cases . . . .”).
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A. Restricting Aid to Religious Institutions
Early Establishment Clause separationism shared the goal of its
Free Exercise cousin: protect the free formation of individual belief.
What it added was a historical narrative about how the Establishment
Clause was intended to serve this purpose. This narrative centered
on the English and colonial governments’ practice of supporting
ministers out of tax funds and regulating religious teaching and
practice. According to the narrative, this practice “shock[ed] the
freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence,” leading them
to the “conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved
best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere
with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.” 178 This
conviction led to disestablishment in Virginia and then to the
enactment of the federal Establishment Clause. 179
Though this narrative may not accurately portray the churchstate debates in the 1780s that led to the Establishment Clause, 180 it
does vividly express the Supreme Court’s concerns in the 1940s and
the following decades. The Court feared that if government were
allowed to aid religion, it would lead to religious conflict, as religious
groups would fight to use government to fund their own institutions
and suppress the religious teachings of other groups. 181 The Court
also opposed government influence on the development of religious
belief in society, 182 and found it immoral that taxpayers’ money
178. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
179. Id. at 11–13.
180. See Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”: Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L.
REV. 443, 450 (2006); see generally DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2004).
181. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9 (“With the power of government supporting them . . .
Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects
had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted
Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews.”);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (Early Americans “knew the anguish, hardship and
bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to
obtain the Government’s stamp of approval from each King, Queen, or Protector that came to
temporary power.”).
182. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (“Almighty God hath created the mind free . . . .”); id. at
41 n.29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”) (internal quotation
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should be used to support the teaching of religious beliefs—
particularly beliefs with which they disagreed. 183 (This last concern
was particularly important to the strictly separationist dissenting
Justices.) 184 All of these problems pointed toward the same solution:
a constitutional prohibition on government aid to religion.
This solution, however, led to a more intractable problem:
religious people and institutions are not solely religious. They are
also people and institutions, and as people and institutions not only
depend on government aid but frequently have a constitutional right
to it. As Everson put it, government may not permissibly
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.
Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation. 185

The “difficulty” lay “in drawing the line between tax legislation
which provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that
which is designed to support institutions which teach religion.” 186 In
other words, the difficulty lay in defining the church from which the
state had to be kept separate—in distinguishing between situations in
which aid goes to religion itself, and is therefore impermissible, and
situations in which aid goes to people or institutions that happen to
be religious, and is therefore permissible.
It would not be accurate to say that the Court had no answer to
this question; indeed, already in Everson it had several answers and
could not bring itself to say which of them was correct. All of them
did have one thing in common: like the Court’s Free Exercise
separationism, each solution presumed that the core of religion was
marks omitted); Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (“Our Founders were no more willing to let the
content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by
the ballot box than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the
succession of monarchs.”).
183. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (noting that Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance
“eloquently argued . . . that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to
support a religious institution of any kind . . . ”); id. at 13 (“[T]o compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful
and tyrannical . . . .”).
184. Id. at 44–45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 16 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 14.
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the teaching of religious belief, and each aimed to keep government
separate from the teaching of religious belief. 187 But these answers
took varying approaches to determining when aid was actually going
to the teaching of religious belief and when it was not. One of these
possible answers—a distinction between direct and indirect aid—is
discussed in Part V. The others appear in the paragraphs below.
Purpose. The Everson Court opposed aid “designed to support
institutions which teach religion,” 188 and its Due Process analysis
acknowledged that New Jersey’s bus subsidy was “legislation
intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular
education” and served a “public purpose.” 189 Nevertheless, the
Court did not suggest that all aid with a secular purpose is
permissible, and for good reason: the practice of establishing a
religion for purely political purposes goes back millennia.
Neutrality. In Everson, the Court emphasized repeatedly that the
program of aid was neutral with respect to religion, saying that it did
“no more than provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and
from accredited schools.” 190
Writing in dissent, Justice Jackson expressed an understanding of
separationism that combined the ideas of secular purpose and
religious neutrality with a pair of vivid examples:
A policeman protects a Catholic, of course—but not because he is a
Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our society.
The fireman protects the Church school—but not because it is a
Church school; it is because it is property, part of the assets of our
society. Neither the fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he
renders aid “Is this man or building identified with the
Catholic Church?” 191

187. This prefigured the Court’s concern in later cases that public aid should not be used
for religious instruction and that the government itself should not be engaged in religious
instruction. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). It also fit the Court’s historical claim that the government-paid
ministers were among the primary evils the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent.
188. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14.
189. Id. at 7.
190. Id. at 18.
191. Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Yet the Court left unclear whether aid to religious institutions
was always permissible if it had a secular purpose and was religiously
neutral. Instead, it mentioned at least one more potential criterion
for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible aid:
“Marked off from the religious function.” Unlike Justice Jackson,
the majority saw police and fire protection and the provision of roads
and public utilities as permissible not merely because they were
neutral and had a secular purpose, but because they were “separate”
and “indisputably marked off from the religious function.” 192 This
distinction—between aid closely related to the teaching of religion
and aid “marked off from” it—would be echoed in the Court’s
later cases.
To summarize: the Court’s early separationism aimed to avoid
religious conflict, to insulate the teaching of religion from
government influence, and to prevent taxpayers’ money from being
spent on the teaching of religion. The Court pursued these goals by
(among other things) announcing restrictions on aid to religious
institutions, but it did not make clear how to distinguish between aid
to religion, which was impermissible, and aid to the general public,
which was permissible even though religious groups would inevitably
benefit from it. The Everson Court emphasized that, in order to be
permissible, aid had to be religiously neutral and have.a nonreligious public purpose, but the Court left open the possibility that
there might be other requirements as well.
B. Direct Aid: The Lemon and Nyquist Approach
The conventional understanding of what separationism means
for direct aid to religious institutions was defined not by Everson, but
by nine direct aid cases decided between 1971 and 1977. Even in
these cases, separationism did not mean that all government actions
that benefitted religion were unconstitutional; rather, even the
Court’s strictest separationist decisions recognized, as Everson had
recognized, that the Court’s task was to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible aid to religious institutions, rather
than to ban all such aid. Further, as in Everson and in the Court’s
Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Court considered the formation of
religious belief to be the heart of the church, and it therefore agreed
with Everson that the chief evil to be prevented was the funding of
192. Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
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religious education. The Court’s motives were even somewhat
similar, with an emphasis on preventing conflict among
religious groups.
The 1970s Court differed from Everson in the way it discerned
whether aid actually went to religion or merely to people or
institutions that were involved in religion. Whereas Everson’s analysis
focused primarily on the aid’s religiously neutral character, with
secondary emphasis on its indirect nature and legitimate secular
purpose, Lemon declared that in addition to a secular purpose,
permissible aid had to have a secular “primary effect” and had to
avoid “excessive entanglement” with religion. 193 These requirements
were applied in eight more direct aid cases in the space of seven
years, 194 but new cases did more to express the Court’s confusion
than to resolve it.
In particular, the primary effect analysis was hopelessly
indeterminate. For example, would a neutral program distributing
aid directly to parochial schools have the primary effect of helping
students or the primary effect of advancing recipient schools’
religious purposes? As Eisgruber and Sager have pointed out, the
answer is unavoidably “both.” 195 How would it even be possible to
aid students at parochial schools without making parochial schools
more attractive to potential students and thus helping the schools
fulfill their religious mission?

193. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
194. The string of cases beginning with Lemon follows, in chronological order: Lemon,
403 U.S. 602 (invalidating a subsidy for the salaries of teachers of secular subjects at religious
schools); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding construction grants for secular
buildings at religious universities); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (invalidating reimbursement of certain state-mandated
administrative costs); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (permitting the issue of revenue
bonds for religious universities); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating direct grants for building maintenance at religious
schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (allowing textbook loans to religious schools,
but striking down various other kinds of support), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (permitting
construction grants to religious universities); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(allowing some forms of aid but prohibiting others; in particular, prohibiting provision of
transportation for religious schools’ field trips), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793; New York
v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (prohibiting reimbursement of certain statemandated record-keeping costs). The third appendix of WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 111, at
305–38, was invaluable for this research.
195. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 31.
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Despite the confusion, the Court’s definition of the church from
which government had to be kept separate began to develop certain
contours. Decisions turned primarily on two questions. The first was
whether the recipient was pervasively sectarian, meaning that its
religious and secular functions could not be separated from each
other. If the school was not pervasively sectarian, then its secular
functions could be funded so long as the funding had a secular
purpose and was religiously neutral. 196 But if the recipient was
pervasively sectarian, then it was effectively always part of the
religious sphere, always a religion and never an institution that
merely happened to be religious. Whether aid to such an institution
was permissible depended on the second question: whether the
nature of the aid was such that it could not be converted to religious
use—an echo of Everson’s idea of aid “indisputably marked off from
the religious function.” 197 If the aid could be used only for nonreligious purposes, such as distribution of secular textbooks to
religious schools, then the aid was permissible. 198
These two questions had the virtue of diverting attention from
the intractable problems of the “primary effect” analysis, but they
put the focus squarely on the Court’s understanding of religion and
the church, which the Court failed to articulate coherently. How
exactly could courts distinguish between a religious charity’s secular
and religious functions? Religious charities often do not perceive any
of their work as secular, 199 and they may consider all of their efforts
to be part of preaching their religion. Likewise, if a court concluded
that an institution was pervasively sectarian, how could it tell
whether aid could be put to religious use? In both of these issues,
the Court’s answer was to understand religion (as it had in Everson)
as sectarian belief, and to try to prevent governments from being too
closely associated with the propagation of sectarian belief. 200
Yet this was insufficient to distinguish reliably between sacred
and secular, especially in the context of pervasively sectarian
196. See Roemer, 426 U.S. 736; McNair, 413 U.S. 734; Tilton, 403 U.S. 672; Esbeck,
supra note 4, at 10; Stephen V. Monsma, The “Pervasively Sectarian” Standard in Theory and
Practice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 323 (1999).
197. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
198. See Meek, 421 U.S. 349.
199. See, e.g., Ten Ways Catholic Charities Are Catholic, CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA,
http://catholiccharitiesusa.org/mission-faith/catholic-values/ (“The work we do has its roots
deep in the scriptures.”).
200. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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institutions. The Court’s efforts to define “pervasively sectarian” led
to “an uncertain, wavering standard that . . . [was] applied in a
sporadic, inconsistent manner” 201 In practice, it seemed that
religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools were
pervasively sectarian, while religiously affiliated colleges and
universities were not, 202 but it was unclear from the Court’s
reasoning why that should be the case. Worse, the decisions
concerning the sorts of aid that could not be converted to religious
purposes led to some of the worst confusion in the history of
Religion Clause jurisprudence, including the famously nonsensical
holding in Wolman v. Walter that state governments may give
religious schools books, but not maps. 203 As Senator Moynihan
quipped, what would the Court have said about “atlases, which are
books of maps?” 204
The “pervasively sectarian” doctrine also proved problematic
because it seemed to require not just discrimination between
religious and secular institutions—separationism has always required
that—but discrimination among religious institutions based on how
much they chose to integrate their religious beliefs into their work, a
sort of discrimination much more difficult to square with
separationist principles, and one with an embarrassing anti-Catholic
past. 205 It also required courts to investigate institutions’ religious
beliefs and how much those beliefs were reflected in their practices—
hardly the sort of inquiry a court committed to separating church
and state should be comfortable with. 206
In short, most of the difficulties in the Court’s strict
separationism arose not from the idea of separationism nor from the
principle that government should not pay for religious instruction
but from the Court’s particular approach to distinguishing between
aid to religion and aid to people who happen to be religious. In
particular, the difficulties arose from the Court’s theologically
dubious attempt to distinguish between institutions that are
pervasively religious and institutions that are only partially religious,

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Monsma, supra note 196, at 325.
Esbeck, supra note 4, at 11.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255.
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 32.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2002) (plurality opinion).
Id.
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and from its economically dubious attempt to discern whether aid
could be put to a religious purpose.
C. Direct Aid and Religious Speech: Modern Version
Since the 1980s, the Court’s “pervasively sectarian” distinction
has fallen apart. The doctrine’s influence began diminishing in the
1980s, when the Court declined to apply it in a number of cases to
which it was arguably relevant. 207 In 2000, the plurality opinion of
Mitchell v. Helms explicitly repudiated it, 208 and it has not been
mentioned by any of the Court’s majority or plurality opinions since.
By abandoning the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine, the Court in
effect narrowed the religious sphere. No longer are any institutions
so pervaded with religion that they have to be treated as religious all
the time—all religiously affiliated institutes are recognized to have
both religious and non-religious elements, and every institution is
treated as religious when it is teaching its sectarian beliefs and as
secular when it is not. This principle allows churches to be just
buildings when seen by the fire department and just crime victims
when protected by the police, and also to remain religious
organizations whose religious beliefs the government must not
interfere with or promote. In other words, the abandonment of the
pervasively sectarian doctrine is easily reconciled with Everson.
Likewise, the Court has largely abandoned its futile attempts to
distinguish between aid that can be put to religious purposes and aid
that cannot. Once the Court’s efforts in this area had tied its
doctrine thoroughly in knots, 209 it increasingly concluded that only
207. See id. at 826–27.
208. Id. at 829.
209. In 1985, Justice Rehnquist described the chaos as follows:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain
maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for
use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history,
but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in
history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks
in which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them nonreusable. A
State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus
transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history
museum for a field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different building;
speech and hearing “services” conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are
forbidden . . . but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing
inside the sectarian school. . . . Exceptional parochial school students may receive
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the lack of a secular purpose or failure to be religiously neutral made
an aid program impermissible. Now the government can pay for
remedial instruction in secular subjects on religious school
campuses 210 and lend instructional materials to religious schools for
use in their secular curriculum. 211 So long as the aid has a secular
purpose and is religiously neutral, it is not constitutionally invalid.
“The question,” according to the Mitchell plurality, “is ultimately a
question whether any religious indoctrination that occurs in those
schools could reasonably be attributed to governmental action.” 212
Both of these doctrinal developments are commonly taken as
evidence that the Court has repudiated separationism. But in fact,
the Court has only repudiated a single problematic approach to
determining whether the state was impermissibly aiding the
church—an approach the Court did not adopt before the 1970s and
already began retreating from in the 1980s. And once the Court had
retreated, the core of Everson’s separationism remained: a
requirement that all aid have a secular purpose and a requirement
that it be religiously neutral.
V. THE NEW SEPARATIONISM: RECOGNIZING “THE INSTITUTIONS
OF PRIVATE CHOICE”
Perhaps the most controversial element of the Court’s supposed
repudiation of separationism is the Court’s increasing willingness to
allow the government to subsidize students’ tuition to religious
private schools. The Court’s 1970s separationism strictly forbade this
sort of aid on the grounds that it paid for religious as well as secular
instruction. 213 Even the Everson Court would likely have balked
before a neutral subsidy that helped students pay their parochial
counseling, but it must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a trailer
parked down the street. . . . A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for
the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it
may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects.”
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110–11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
210. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
211. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793.
212. Id. at 809.
213. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783
(1973) (invalidating a tuition reimbursement program because “[t]here has been no endeavor
to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure
that State financial aid supports only the former”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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school tuition, despite all its emphasis on neutrality and despite the
transportation subsidy it approved having a similar (if smaller) effect.
The Court’s willingness to allow such aid is one of the strongest
pieces of evidence for the conventional narrative.
Nevertheless, the Court’s new willingness to allow indirect aid to
religious institutions can be defended both as consistent with
separationism and as a development of ideas implicit in the Court’s
earliest separationist cases: Everson and Board of Education v. Allen. 214
The metaphor of separating church and state does not preclude the
possibility of there being a middle ground between the two; there
may be entities in society that are neither part of the church nor the
state, and which do not need to be separated from either of them. If
such entities are recognized, then they may interact freely with both
the church and the state without violating the separation of church
and state. Everson and Allen recognized the possible importance of
such entities, and it was not until the 1970s that the Court began
striking down aid that was passed through intermediaries in this
manner. Contrary to the conventional narrative, the rejection of the
1970s’ approach was not a rejection of separationism itself, but a
return to and redevelopment of an older separationism.
A. The Theoretical Possibility, and Practical Necessity, of a
Middle Ground
Among the important implications of the separation metaphor is
that, for purposes of separating church and state, “church” and
“state” are not necessarily collectively exhaustive categories. There
remains the possibility of some entities that do not need to be
separated from either church or state. Expressed in terms of
separationism’s spatial metaphor, these phenomena could be
conceived of as the middle ground between church and state, a place
where both church and state can be active without
implicating separationism.
Admittedly, separationist reasoning both on the Court and in
scholarship has not generally recognized the possibility of middle
ground between church and state. Instead, when the Court or
scholars have applied the metaphor of separation, they have usually
described differences between possible approaches to separationism
in terms of how absolute separation needs to be, how high
214. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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Jefferson’s “wall of separation” needs to be, where the wall should
be, and so forth, without talking about how church and state relate
to the rest of society. 215 Further, both the Court and scholars have
sometimes used “public” and “private” to describe the government
and religious spheres respectively, 216 and there is not obviously a
middle ground between public and private the way there may
potentially be between church and state. But there are several
persistent aspects of separationist reasoning that can best be
understood as assuming the existence of a middle ground, and these
aspects were visible from the early years of the Court’s separationism.
The most important of these aspects is the Court’s recognition,
even in its most separationist decisions, that the separation of church
and state cannot be absolute. 217 As the Court recognized as early as
Everson, religion and government will inevitably interact in a variety
of ways, not all of which implicate separationism. 218 One of the chief
categories of church-state interaction that are commonly understood
to be permissible is interaction that is mediated by civil society.
I illustrate with two examples of church-state interactions that
could not possibly be considered contrary to separationism, or at
least to any form of separationism that could ever be plausible in the
United States. The first example occurs when government employees
or welfare recipients choose to donate money to churches. In this
case, the money being donated clearly comes from the government,
since all of the donor’s money comes from the government, and it is
clearly given to religion. Of course, the government does not give
the money to the donor for the purpose of having it donated to a
church, but it pays its employees and the beneficiaries of its social

215. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 22.
216. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (“[P]reservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the
private sphere.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (“[R]eligion is too personal, too
sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”); Denise
Meyerson, Why Religion Belongs in the Private Sphere, Not the Public Square, in LAW AND
RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 44, 44–71 (Peter Cane, Carolyn
Evans & Zoe Robinson, eds. 2009).
217. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760 (“It has never been thought either possible or
desirable to enforce a regime of total separation.”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971) (“[T]otal separation is not possible in an absolute sense.”).
218. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (arguing that the First
Amendment does not aim to completely sever the benefits of any public service from
religious institutions).

51

HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

2015

programs knowing that many will pass some of that money along to
churches, where the money will be used for religious purposes.
The second example is the influence of religion on elections by
way of voters’ religious beliefs. Although legislation passed for
exclusively religious reasons is unconstitutional, 219 the stricter
Rawlsian idea that political arguments must be based on public
reason has never become part of the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. 220 Nor indeed could it. Under the Free Speech Clause,
citizens have a constitutional right to make whatever political
arguments they wish, regardless of the arguments’ religious or
irreligious character. 221 Citizens may vote based on whatever criteria
they choose, including a candidate’s religious identity or the
perceived agreement between the candidate’s ideology and the
citizens’ religious beliefs. Conversely, candidates have a right to make
their religious identity known and to choose platforms consistent
with their own or their constituents’ religion. If the candidates are
elected, they may be influenced by religion so long as they can also
give secular reasons for their actions. 222
One way of understanding why these two examples are
permissible is to explain them as a compromise. Under this
approach, these examples are contrary to separationism, but they
must be permitted for the sake of other constitutional values.
Government employees must be allowed to donate to religious
groups because banning such contributions would be discriminatory
and infringe on several First Amendment rights: Free Exercise, Free
Speech, and Freedom of Association. Religion must be permitted to
influence politics by way of voters’ religious beliefs because the Free
219. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (holding that statutes “must have a secular
legislative purpose”).
220. Compare JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED EDITION 212–47
(1993) (arguing that ideal public discourse about political issues excludes references to
religious concepts, doctrines, and values), with McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445
(1961) (holding that laws requiring the cessation of commerce on Sundays did not violate
the Establishment Clause because they served secular purposes apart from their original
religious purposes).
221. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is
axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys.”).
222. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445 (“Sunday Closing Laws, like those before us,
have become part and parcel of this great governmental concern wholly apart from their
original [religious] purposes or connotations. The present purpose and effect of most of them
is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens.”).
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Speech Clause does not permit the government to censor religiously
based political arguments or to require voters to vote based on
public reason (perhaps by requiring them to swear an oath to that
effect when they register). This approach has some intuitive appeal
because separationism, if it is a constitutional value, must of course
coexist with other constitutional values.
But a better way of understanding these examples is that they do
not violate separationism even in principle. As I suggested in Section
II.B, there is nothing about the metaphor “separation of church and
state” that requires the categories “church” and “state” to include
everything. If we recognize the existence of a middle ground, which
is by definition neither religion nor government but may interact
with both, then we can conceive of both of these examples as
involving the middle ground rather than direct interactions between
church and state. In the case of government employees’ religious
donations, the government gives money not to religion but to free
private citizens, and religion receives money not from the
government but from these free private citizens. In the case of
voters’ religious motivations, we can conceive of religion not as
influencing government, but as influencing free private citizens who
are then free to influence the government. These citizens act as a
buffer, a neutral zone, a way of mediating interactions between
government and religion while keeping the church and state separate
(whatever “church” and “state” mean in one’s particular
understanding of separationism).
But if this is the case, then how do we tell when the middle
ground effectively stands between church and state? This will depend
on just what one understands “church” and “state” to be, since the
middle ground must by definition be neither church nor state. But
the examples above suggest that a defining characteristic of the
middle ground is the presence of free, private choice. 223 The reason
government employees can donate money they have received from
the government to churches is that they, not the government,
choose to make the donations. The reasons voters can vote based on
their religious beliefs is that they choose whether to be persuaded by
223. The Supreme Court itself alludes to this characteristic: “The Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of
private choice.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added). Cf. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7 (“So
long as individuals may freely choose or not choose religion, merely enabling private decisions
logically cannot be a governmental establishment of religion.”).
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religious arguments or not—at no point does religion itself, however
defined, actually dictate which candidate they will vote for, and at no
point does a religious organization gain actual authority
over government.
Defining civil society in terms of free private choice also helps
explain the persistent connection between separationism and
neutrality. There seems to be no reason in principle why separating
church and state would require the government to be neutral
between religion and non-religion. Indeed, it seems to require the
opposite: as Eisgruber and Sager point out, separating religion from
government requires government to treat religion both better and
worse than non-religion, since non-religion does not need to be
separated from government and therefore does not have the special
rights and disabilities that come with separation. 224
Yet as early as Everson, the Court already associated separation
with the idea that government may neither “handicap” nor “favor”
religions, 225 nor “aid all religions.” 226 There are many reasons to
associate this idea with separationism—one of which figures
prominently in Part IV above—but one important reason derives
from free private choice as a characteristic of civil society.
If free private choice is necessary for private citizens to insulate
religion and government from each other, then any government
actions that restrict free private choice take private citizens out of the
equation, thereby bringing church and state into direct contact with
each other and potentially violating separationism. A law subsidizing
government employees’ donations to religious organizations but not
to other charities would thus violate the separation of church and
state, as would a requirement that voters take an oath promising to
vote based on religious teachings rather than purely secular
reasoning, or a religious test insuring that only candidates of a
particular religious identity could be elected. 227 Neutrality between
religion and non-religion thus supports separation of church and

224. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 29.
225. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
226. Id. at 15.
227. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1961) (appealing to separationism
to strike down religious tests for office).
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state by preserving free private choice and allowing “the institutions
of private choice” to insulate church and state from each other. 228
B. Expanding the Middle Ground; Shrinking Separationism
Separationism has become less important in the Court’s
jurisprudence because the Court has been increasingly willing to see
interactions between religion and government as mediated by private
choice and therefore not implicating separationism. Without being
repudiated, separationism thus becomes less important simply
because it decides fewer cases.
To be more specific, one of the doctrinal developments that has
been given as evidence of separationism’s decline is the series of
cases, beginning in 1983 with Mueller v. Allen, 229 permitting greater
indirect aid to religious schools—that is, aid given to individuals
rather than directly to the schools themselves. 230 Scholars who use
these cases as evidence of separationism’s decline assume that
indirect aid to religious schools violates separationism, 231 but that is
not necessarily the case. It depends in large part on whether one’s
conception of separationism permits private choice to act as a buffer
between religion and government and on how one defines
private choice.
Prior to separationism’s decline, the Court heard only four
indirect aid cases, upholding indirect aid in Everson and Board of
Education v. Allen 232 before striking it down in Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist 233 and Sloan v. Lemon. 234 Importantly, all four of
these cases presented themselves as consistent with separation of
church and state—in particular, Everson and Allen did not consider
indirect aid to religion a departure from separation of church and

228. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. Cf. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7 (“In situations of indirect
assistance [to religion], the equal treatment of religion—not separationism—is the Court’s
operative rule for interpreting the Establishment Clause.”).
229. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
230. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 8, at 242 (presenting the Court’s decision to allow states
to make private school tuition tax deductible as part of “a process of repudiation of Lemon in
the very aid-to-parochial-schools context in which it originated”). I borrow the term “indirect
aid” from Carl Esbeck. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7.
231. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 8, at 242; Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7.
232. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
233. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
234. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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state. 235 Everson itself, the case that introduced the phrase “separation
between church and state” into modern constitutional law, was
especially emphatic on this point: “[The] wall between church and
state . . . must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve
the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here.” 236
Of these four cases, Everson makes the greatest use of the idea of
civil society as a middle ground between church and state. Although
the Everson Court did not draw any clear line between the types of
aid to religion that violate separationism and those that do not, its
attempt to reconcile New Jersey’s aid program with the separationist
principles it endorsed relied on the same two points that defined my
discussion of the middle ground above. First, although the Court
acknowledged that religious schools might benefit from the
program, 237 it emphasized that the aid was not actually distributed to
religious schools: “The State contributes no money to the schools. It
does not support them.” 238 Second, the Court emphasized that the
money was given to individuals on neutral terms, leaving them free
to spend it religiously or otherwise: “[This] legislation, as applied,
does no more than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to
and from accredited schools.” 239 In other words, the Court
permitted the aid in part because it was distributed to private
individuals and only benefited religion through individuals’ free
choice to use it at a religious school rather than a secular one.
But the Court did not hold that aid distributed to private
individuals is always permissible, and the Court’s next three indirect

235. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Allen, 392 U.S. at 242;
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 832 (holding, based on Lemon’s
separationist reasoning, that the aid in question was impermissible).
236. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Of course, the Court’s emphatic assertion has not
persuaded everyone. Justice Jackson joked that the Court, while “whispering I will ne’er
consent,—consented.” Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also SEHAT, supra note 40, at 236 (“The majority’s argument consisted largely of a ringing
endorsement of church-state separation as a way to prove its concern for the concept while at
the same time affirming a connection between religion and the state.”).
237. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (“It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to
church schools. There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children’s bus fares out of their
own pockets.”).
238. Id. at 18.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
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aid decisions would gradually abandon Everson’s focus on
civil society.
In the next indirect aid case, Board of Education v. Allen, civil
society analysis reminiscent of Everson still played an important
role, 240 helping the Court conclude that lending secular textbooks to
students at parochial schools did indeed have a secular purpose. 241
But there were already signs of civil society’s diminished influence.
Most importantly, the Court left open the possibility that if the
secular textbooks had been proven to aid schools’ religious
instruction, the outcome might have been different. 242 This marked a
departure from Everson, where obviously the bus money given to
students helped them receive religious instruction as well as secular.
Nyquist and Sloan, decided on the same day in 1973, both
addressed state programs that subsidized parents’ expenditures on
private school tuition, 243 and both used the Lemon test to invalidate
the tuition subsidies. 244 Sloan did not cite Everson or Allen’s civil
society reasoning at all, while Nyquist devoted a lengthy passage to
distinguishing it. 245
According to Nyquist,that the state gave money to parents rather
than directly to the schools weighed in favor of constitutionality, but
it was “only one among many factors to be considered” in
determining whether the aid’s primary effect advanced or inhibited
religion. 246 The Nyquist Court argued that the aid in Everson and
Allen was “indisputably marked off from the religious function” in a
way that tuition subsidies could not be, even though the
transportation subsidy in Everson helped students receive religious
instruction as well as secular. 247 That the parents were the primary
beneficiaries did not ultimately matter because helping the parents
240. 392 U.S. 236, 243–44 (1968) (“[N]o funds or books are furnished to parochial
schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.”).
241. Id.
242. See id. at 248 (dismissing an argument based on the textbooks’ supposed usefulness
for religious teaching because the necessary facts had not been established—not because the
issue was legally irrelevant).
243. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764 (1973);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 837 (1973). Nyquist also concerned a direct subsidy to
religious schools for building maintenance, 413 U.S. at 762–64, but as it is not relevant to my
civil society analysis, I will not discuss it here.
244. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772–73; Sloan, 413 U.S. at 828–830.
245. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780–87.
246. Id. at 781.
247. Id. at 782 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
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helped the schools; 248 it was the effect on religion that mattered,
even if the effect was indirect. And the idea that the parents’ free
choice to send their children to religious schools might sufficiently
insulate religion from government was dismissed out of hand:
The parent is not a mere conduit, we are told, but is absolutely free
to spend the money he receives in any manner he wishes. There is
no element of coercion attached to the reimbursement, and no
assurance that the money will eventually end up in the hands of
religious schools. The absence of any element of coercion, however, is
irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause. 249

Nyquist thus rejected the idea that the free choice of members of
civil society provides sufficient insulation between religion and
government for separationist purposes. What mattered was how
much religion benefited in the end, not whether the benefit to
religion really came from the government and not from the parents.
But the Court has never again restricted indirect aid as it did in
Nyquist and Sloan, and a mere ten years later in Mueller, the Court
used civil society reasoning to uphold a tuition subsidy, this time in
the form of a tax deduction instead of vouchers and tax credits. Like
Nyquist, Mueller applied the Lemon test, 250 but key to the Mueller
Court’s reasoning was that “under Minnesota’s arrangement public
funds become available [to religious institutions] only as a result of
numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age
children.” 251 This would become a common theme in the Court’s
indirect aid cases. In Witters in 1987, the Court pointed out that
“[a]ny aid provided under Washington’s program that ultimately
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.” 252 In
Zobrest in 1993, the Court cited Mueller’s and Witters’s language
about private choice and declared, “That same reasoning applies with
equal force here.” 253 In Zelman in 2002, the Court claimed that
our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has
remained consistent and unbroken. Three times we have

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
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Id. at 783.
Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
Id. at 399.
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1993).
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confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government
programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals,
who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of
their own choosing. Three times we have rejected
such challenges. 254

Most recently, in 2011, Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn demonstrated the continued vitality of civil
society reasoning by using it to limit taxpayer standing, pointing out
that the religious schools in question did not receive funds from
government but from “the decisions of private taxpayers regarding
their own funds.” 255
Again, the common interpretation of these developments is to
see them as repudiations of separationism, and certainly there is
some evidence for that conclusion—in particular, the Justices who
have supported indirect aid have often supported non-separationist
outcomes in other cases. 256 But seeing the cases that loosen
restrictions on indirect aid as nothing but repudiations of
separationism means failing to see the conflict within separationism
where indirect aid is concerned. It means assuming that Nyquist
represents the sole correct separationist position on indirect aid
without acknowledging that other cases have upheld indirect aid
regimes on explicitly separationist grounds, usually by concluding
that the aid to religion in question really came from civil society and
not from government.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF SEPARATIONISM
Separationism is not dead. Religion in general may no longer be
separated from government to the extent it once was, but religious
belief still receives special constitutional protection. This special
protection for religious belief leads to special constitutional status for
the practices and institutions through which religious belief is
254. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002). The “three times” the
Court mentions are Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest. Id. Apparently the Court did not consider
Everson, Mueller, Zelman, or Sloan “true private choice programs.”
255. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1439 (2011).
256. For example, Chief Justice Burger dissented in Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 805 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and joined
the Mueller v. Allen majority, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), and he also wrote the non-separationist
majority opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Similarly, Justice Rehnquist
joined the Mueller majority only two years before launching a frontal attack on separationism
in his Wallace v. Jaffree dissent. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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formed. This special status still gives these institutions special rights
under the Free Exercise Clause and special disabilities under the
Establishment Clause: the government’s ability to regulate religious
speech and institutions is specially curtailed, and it is still specially
prohibited from involving itself in the teaching of religion.
The difference between the Court’s religion jurisprudence in the
1970s and its jurisprudence today is not that the 1970s Court was
committed to separationism and the current Court is not. Instead,
today’s Court’s separationism is narrower because it is committed to
a narrower conception of the church from which the state needs to
be separated. In Free Exercise jurisprudence, the state no longer
needs to be separated from all actions motivated by religious belief,
but rather only from those necessary for the formation of
religious belief.
Under the Establishment Clause, the Court no longer recognizes
some institutions as being “pervasively” religious. Instead, it
recognizes that all religious people and organizations are, for some
purposes, just people and organizations, and that they may therefore
be aided and supported by the state without regard to their religion.
The state may not, however, aid them without a secular purpose,
since giving them money in order to encourage the teaching of
religion would involve the state in the teaching of religion.
Likewise, because the free choice of private citizens to choose
religious rather than non-religious education cannot be attributed to
a neutral state aid program, the state may freely subsidize private
citizens’ choices so long as the subsidies are neutral. Thus, the
Court’s emphasis on neutrality, far from supplanting separationism,
is actually an approach to implementing separationism that can
already be seen in the Everson decision.
In reality, the strict separationism whose death has been
mourned by some and celebrated by others was only a brief phase in
separationism’s long history on the Court—a phase that, if it is to be
considered superior to this one, must say more for itself than that it
is the inevitable logical conclusion of an American tradition of
church and state. It is not. If there is such a tradition, the Court’s
present separationism is arguably more faithful to it than the
1970s’ model.
I admit, I have my reservations about even the best
separationism as an all-encompassing theory of the Religion Clauses.
Separationism is too individualistic, too focused on religion as a
60

HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

The Very Old New Separationism

matter of belief—in short, too Protestant for my decidedly nonProtestant religious commitments, which are focused more on ritual,
practice, and community than the Supreme Court’s religion
jurisprudence has tended to be. But the freedom to believe is
nevertheless precious, and the Court’s current separationism really
does protect it more than a pure neutrality regime would. As far as it
goes, I hope it lasts.
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